We provide a constructive direct semantic proof of the completeness of the cut-free part of the hypersequent calculus HIF for the standard first-order Gödel logic (thereby proving both completeness of the calculus for its standard semantics, and the admissibility of the cut rule in the full calculus). The results also apply to derivations from assumptions (or "non-logical axioms"), showing in particular that when the set of assumptions is closed under substitutions, then cuts can be confined to formulas occurring in the assumptions. The methods and results are then extended to handle the (Baaz) Delta connective as well.
Introduction
In [17] Gödel introduced a sequence {G n } (n ≥ 2) of n-valued matrices in the language of propositional intuitionistic logic. He used these matrices to show some important properties of intuitionistic logic. An infinite-valued matrix G ω in which all the G n s can be embedded was later introduced by Dummett in [14] . G ω , in turn, can naturally be embedded in a matrix G [0, 1] , the truth-values of which are the real numbers between 0 and 1 (inclusive). It has not been difficult to show that the sets of valid formulas in G ω and in G [0, 1] are identical, and both are known today as "Gödel logic". 1 Later it has been shown that this logic is also characterized as the logic of linearly ordered intuitionistic Kripke frames (see [15] , [16] ). Gödel logic is probably the most important intermediate logic, i.e. a logic between intuitionistic logic and classical logic. In the last fifteen years it has again attracted a lot of attention because of its recognition as one of the three most basic fuzzy logics [18] .
Gödel logic can be naturally extended to the first-order framework. In particular, the standard first-order Gödel logic (the logic based on [0, 1] as the set of truth-values) has been introduced and investigated in [24] (where it was called "intuitionistic fuzzy logic"). The Kripke-style semantics of this logic is provided by the class of all linearly ordered intuitionistic Kripke frames with constant domains.
A cut-free Gentzen-type formulation for (propositional) Gödel logic was first given by Sonobe in [21] . Since then several other such calculi which employ ordinary sequents have been proposed (see [11, 1, 12, 5, 13] ). All these calculi have the drawback of using some ad-hoc rules of a nonstandard form, in which several occurrences of connectives are involved. In contrast, in [3] a cut-free Gentzen-type proof system HG for Definition 6 Let M = D, I be an L-algebra, J be an L, D -predicate interpretation, and e be an L, Mevaluation. The function • M,J,e from frm L to [0, 1] is recursively defined as follows: 2. ⊥ M,J,e = 0.
3. ϕ 1 ⊃ ϕ 2 M,J,e = 1 if ϕ 1 M,J,e ≤ ϕ 2 M,J,e , and ϕ 1 ⊃ ϕ 2 M,J,e = ϕ 2 M,J,e otherwise. 4 . ϕ 1 ∨ ϕ 2 M,J,e = max{ ϕ 1 M,J,e , ϕ 2 M,J,e }.
5. ϕ 1 ∧ ϕ 2 M,J,e = min{ ϕ 1 M,J,e , ϕ 2 M,J,e }. It is easy to see that • M,J,e is well-defined, and in particular in 6 and 7, the exact choice of the free variable a is immaterial.
Definition 7
Let M = D, I be an L-algebra, J be an L, D -predicate interpretation. We say that M, J is a model of an L-formula ϕ, if ϕ M,J,e = 1 for every L, M -evaluation e. M, J is a model of a set T of L-formulas if it is a model of every ϕ ∈ T .
We now define the consequence relation of Gödel logic in terms of the many-valued semantics:
Definition 8 ( [0,1] ) Let T ∪ {ϕ} be a set of L-formulas. T [0, 1] ϕ if whenever M, J is a model of T , for some L-algebra M = D, I , and L, D -predicate interpretation J, then M, J is also a model of ϕ.
Remark 9
As usual in first-order logics, actually there are two natural consequence relations that can be defined here. In the terminology of [2] , in this paper we concentrate on the validity consequence relation, rather than the truth consequence relation.
Fact 10 ( [18] , [19] ) The Hilbert-style calculus sG is strongly sound and complete with respect to the manyvalued semantics of the standard first-order Gödel logic, i.e. [0,1] = sG .
Kripke-Style Semantics
While the many-valued semantics is perhaps more intuitive, in this paper the Kripke-style semantics is essential to prove our main results. There are two differences between this semantics and the Kripke-style semantics of first-order intuitionistic logic. First, linearly ordered Kripke frames are considered. Second, for first-order Gödel logic we use a constant domain, i.e. the same domain in each world, rather than the expanding domains used for intuitionistic logic.
Definition 11 A Kripke L, D -predicate interpretation is a function assigning a subset of D n to every n-ary predicate symbol of L.
Definition 12 An L-frame is a tuple W = W, ≤, M, I where:
1. W is a set linearly ordered by ≤.
Definition 13 Let W = W, ≤, M, I be an L-frame, where M = D, I and I = {I w } w∈W . Let e be an L, M -evaluation (Definition 4). The satisfaction relation is recursively defined as follows: It is easy to see that is well-defined, and in particular in 6 and 7, the exact choice of the free variable a is immaterial.
It is a routine matter to prove the following proposition:
be an L-frame, and e be an L, M -evaluation. Let ϕ be an L-formula, and u be an element of W such that W, u, e ϕ. Then, W, w, e ϕ for every element w of W such that u ≤ w.
Definition 15 Let W = W, ≤, M, I be an L-frame. W is a model of an L-formula ϕ if W, w, e ϕ for every L, M -evaluation e and w ∈ W . W is a model of a set T of L-formulas if it is a model of every ϕ ∈ T .
We now define the consequence relation of Gödel logic in terms of Kripke-style semantics:
Definition 16 ( Kr ) Let T ∪ {ϕ} be a set of L-formulas. T Kr ϕ if every L-frame W which is a model of T is also a model of ϕ.
Fact 17 ([15])
The Hilbert-style calculus sG is strongly sound and complete with respect to the Kripke-style semantics of the standard first-order Gödel logic, i.e. Kr = sG .
3 The System HIF As indicated in the introduction, the main tool to obtain well-behaved proof systems for Gödel logic is single-conclusion hypersequents.
Definition 18 A single-conclusion sequent is an ordered pair of finite sets of L-formulas Γ, E , where E is either a singleton or empty. A single-conclusion hypersequent is a finite set of single-conclusion sequents.
Henceforth, we simply write sequent instead of single-conclusion sequent, and hypersequent instead of single-conclusion hypersequent. We shall use the usual sequent notation Γ ⇒ E (for Γ, E ) and the usual hypersequent notation s 1 | . . . | s n (for {s 1 , . . . , s n }). We also employ the standard abbreviations, e.g. Γ, ϕ ⇒ ψ instead of Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⇒ {ψ}, and H | s instead of H ∪ {s}.
Notation 19
Given a set H of hypersequents, we denote by frm[H] the set of L-formulas that appear in H.
Next, we review the hypersequent system HIF from [8] .
Definition 20 HIF is the (single-conclusion) hypersequent system containing the following rules: 1. We write H H if there exists a derivation of H from H in HIF.
2. Let E be a set of L-formulas. We write H E H if there exists a derivation of H from H in HIF in which the cut-formula of every application of the cut rule is in E.
As usual, we shall write H instead of ∅ H. Using this notation and the one introduced in the last definition, cut-admissibility means that H iff ∅ H, while strong cut-admissibility means that H H iff
Next, we provide two derivability results for HIF, that will be used in the sequel.
Proposition 22 (Generalized Communication) For every n, m ≥ 0, hypersequents H 1 and H 2 , m + n singleton or empty sets of L-formulas E 1 , . . . , E n , F 1 , . . . , F m , and sets
is cut-free derivable in HIF from the hypersequents
Proof We prove this by induction on n + m. First, when n = 0 or m = 0, the claim follows by applying an external weakening. Assume that n, m > 0, n + m = l and that the claim holds for every n, m such that n + m < l. By the induction hypothesis, the following two hypersequents are cut-free derivable in
An application of (com) on these two hypersequents provides the desired result.
Proposition 23 (Generalized (∨ ⇒)) For every n, m ≥ 0, hypersequents H 1 and H 2 , m + n singleton or empty sets of L-formulas E 1 , . . . , E n , F 1 , . . . , F m , sets Γ 1 , Γ 2 of L-formulas, and two L-formulas ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 :
Proof We prove this by induction on n + m. First, for n = 0 or m = 0, the claim follows by applying an external weakening. Assume that n, m > 0, n + m = l and that the claim holds for every n, m such that n + m < l. By the induction hypothesis, the following two hypersequents are cut-free derivable in HIF from
Finally, the next proposition provides a generalization of the rule (∃ ⇒), to be used in the sequel. The main idea is taken from the proof of Lemma 30 from [7] (used there in the syntactic proof of cut-elimination for HIF). However, here we also consider proofs from non-empty sets of assumptions.
Proposition 24 (Generalized (∃ ⇒)) Let H be a set of hypersequents, and E be a set of L-formulas. Suppose that both H and E are closed under substitutions. Then, for every n ≥ 0, hypersequent H, n singleton or empty sets of L-formulas E 1 , . . . , E n , set Γ of L-formulas, L-formula ϕ, and free variable a which does not occur in H, E 1 , . . . , E n and Γ:
The following standard lemma is required in the proof:
Lemma 25 Let H be a set of hypersequents, and E be a set of L-formulas. Suppose that both H and E are closed under substitutions. For every hypersequent H and two free variables a, b, such that b does not occur in
Proof (of Proposition 24)
We use induction on n. The claim is trivial for n = 0. Now assume that the claim holds for n − 1, we prove it for n. Let H be a hypersequent, Γ ⇒ E 1 , . . . , Γ ⇒ E n be sequents, ϕ be an L-formula, and let a be a free variable which does not occur in H, Γ, E 1 , . . . , E n .
Let b be a free variable which does not occur in G 0 .
By Lemma 25 ,
By Proposition 22, the following hypersequent is cut-free derivable from G 0 and G 0 {b/a}:
(to see this, take
. By an application of (∃ ⇒) on the last hypersequent, we obtain:
The induction hypothesis now entails that
Interpretation of Hypersequents
A better understanding of hypersequents is obtained using the following interpretation ( [8] ).
Definition 26 (Interpretation of Hypersequents)
1. For a non-empty finite set of L-formulas Γ, Γ is the conjunction of the formulas in Γ, and Γ is their disjunction. ∅ is defined to be ⊥⊃⊥, and ∅ is defined to be ⊥.
For a sequent
Theorem 27 H and Int[H] are interderivable in HIF for every non-empty hypersequent H (i.e.
H ⇒ Int[H] and ⇒ Int[H] H).
To prove this theorem, we use the following lemmas:
Lemma 28 Γ ⇒ Γ, for every finite set Γ of L-formulas.
Proof Repeatedly apply identity axioms and (⇒ ∧). In case Γ is empty, ⊥⇒⊥ and (⇒⊃) are needed.
Proof Repeatedly apply identity axioms and Proposition 23.
Lemma 30
The following hold for every hypersequent H, and sequent Γ ⇒ E:
Repeatedly apply (∧ ⇒ 1 ) and (∧ ⇒ 2 ). Internal weakenings are required in case Γ or E are empty.
2. Obtained by Lemma 28 using a cut. In case E is empty, (⊥⇒) and another cut are needed.
Follows from 1 by applying (⇒⊃).

Using identity axioms and (⊃⇒), we can prove
We can now prove Theorem 27.
Proof (of Theorem 27) H
H is now obtained by repeatedly applying Lemma 30 (4).
Using interpretations of hypersequents, soundness and completeness for HIF with respect to the the many-valued semantics were formulated and proved in [8] . Soundness means here that H implies that
To have this, one proves that [0,1] ϕ whenever ϕ is an interpretation of an instance of HIF's axiom, and that ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n [0,1] ϕ whenever ϕ is an interpretation of a conclusion of an instance of HIF's rule, and ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n are the interpretations of the premises of this instance. In turn, completeness means
This was done in [8] relatively to sG. Using Fact 10 and Theorem 27, it suffices to prove that
To have this, one proves that ⇒ ϕ for every axiom instance ϕ of sG, and that whenever ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n → ϕ is an instance of a derivation rule in sG, we have ⇒ ϕ 1 , . . . , ⇒ ϕ n ⇒ ϕ. The existence of the cut rule in HIF turns out to be crucial, to handle the Modus Ponens rule, as well as in the proof of Theorem 27. Thus, aiming to obtain a completeness proof of the cut-free fragment of HIF, we will not follow this approach. In fact, we only need interpretations of hypersequents (and Theorem 27) to obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 31 (Derivability of Substitution) H H{t/a} for every hypersequent H, L-term t, and free variable a.
Proof 
Soundness, Completeness and Strong Cut-Admissibility
In this section we obtain the main result of this paper, which is a semantic proof of strong cut-admissibility for HIF. First, we define a semantic consequence relation between sets of hypersequents and hypersequents. This relation is based on the Kripke-style semantics presented in Section 2.
Notation 33 Given an L-frame W = W, ≤, M, I , an L, M -evaluation e, w ∈ W , and a sequent Γ ⇒ E, we write W, w, e Γ ⇒ E if either W, w, e ϕ for some ϕ ∈ Γ, or W, w, e ϕ for some ϕ ∈ E. Proof Assume that H H. Let W = W, ≤, M, I be an L-frame which is a model of H, where M = D, I and I = {I w } w∈W . We show that for every L, M -evaluation e, there exists a component s ∈ H such that W, w, e s for every w ∈ W . Since the axioms of HIF and the assumptions of H trivially have this property, it suffices to show that this property is preserved also by applications of the rules of HIF. This is a routine matter. We do here only two cases:
Thus there exists an L, M -evaluation e, such that for every s ∈ H, there exists w ∈ W such that W, w, e s. In particular, for every s ∈ H 1 ∪ H 2 , there exists w ∈ W such that W, w, e s. In addition, there exist w 1 ∈ W such that W, w 1 , e Γ 1 , Γ 2 ⇒ E 1 , and w 2 ∈ W such that W, w 2 , e Γ 2 , Γ 1 ⇒ E 2 . By definition, W, w 1 , e ϕ for every ϕ ∈ Γ 1 ∪ Γ 2 , while W, w 1 , e ϕ for every ϕ ∈ E 1 . Analogously, W, w 2 , e ϕ for every ϕ ∈ Γ 2 ∪ Γ 1 , while W, w 2 , e ϕ for every ϕ ∈ E 2 . Since ≤ is linear, either w 1 ≤ w 2 or w 2 ≤ w 1 . Assume w.l.o.g that w 1 ≤ w 2 . Then by Proposition 14, W, w 2 , e ϕ for every ϕ ∈ Γ 2 . It follows that W, w 2 , e Γ 2 , Γ 2 ⇒ E 2 . But this implies that W is not a model of
(where a is a free variable which does not occur in H). . Since a does not occur in Γ, we obtain that W, w 1 , e * ϕ for every ϕ ∈ Γ. It follows that W, w 1 , e * Γ ⇒ ϕ. Moreover, since a does not occur in H , for every s ∈ H , there exists w ∈ W such that W, w, e * s. Hence, W is not a model of H | Γ ⇒ ϕ.
For the completeness proof, we introduce extended sequents and extended hypersequents, defined as follows:
Definition 37 An extended sequent is an ordered pair of (possibly infinite) sets of L-formulas. Given two extended sequents
We shall use the same notations as above for extended sequents and extended hypersequents. For example, we write T ⇒ U instead of T , U , and
Definition 39 An extended sequent T ⇒ U admits the witness property if the following hold:
1. If ∀x(ϕ{x/a}) ∈ U then there exists a free variable b such that ϕ{b/a} ∈ U.
2. If ∃x(ϕ{x/a}) ∈ T then there exists a free variable b such that ϕ{b/a} ∈ T .
Definition 40
Let Ω be an extended hypersequent, and H be a set of (ordinary) hypersequents. 2. Let ϕ be an L-formula. Ω is called internally H-maximal with respect to ϕ if for every T ⇒ U ∈ Ω:
3. Ω is called internally H-maximal if it is internally H-maximal with respect to any L-formula. 4. Let s be a sequent. Ω is called externally H-maximal with respect to s if either {s} Ω, or Ω | s is not H-consistent.
5. Ω is called externally H-maximal if it is externally H-maximal with respect to any sequent of the form E 1 ⇒ E 2 (E 1 and E 2 denote sets of formulas containing at most one formula).
6
. Ω admits the witness property if every µ ∈ Ω admits the witness property.
7
. Ω is called H-maximal if it is H-consistent, internally H-maximal, externally H-maximal, and it admits the witness property.
Less
Obviously, every hypersequent is an extended hypersequent, and so all of these properties apply to (ordinary) hypersequents as well.
Proposition 41
Let Ω be an extended hypersequent, which is internally H-maximal with respect to an Lformula ϕ. For every T ⇒ U ∈ Ω:
Proof
1. Let T ⇒ U ∈ Ω such that ϕ ∈ T . By internal maximality, Ω | T , ϕ ⇒ U is not Hconsistent, and so there exists a hypersequent
Note that for every sequent Γ ⇒ E ∈ H which does not occur in H, we have ϕ ∈ Γ, Γ \ {ϕ} ⊆ T , and E ⊆ U. Let Γ 1 ⇒ E 1 , . . . , Γ n ⇒ E n be an enumeration of these sequents, and let Γ = Γ i \ {ϕ}. By applying internal weakenings on H , we obtain
2. Let T ⇒ U ∈ Ω such that ϕ ∈ U. By internal maximality, Ω | T ⇒ U, ϕ is not Hconsistent, and so there exists a hypersequent
Note that for every sequent Γ ⇒ E ∈ H which does not occur in H, we have E = {ϕ} and Γ ⊆ T . Let Γ 1 ⇒ ϕ, . . . , Γ n ⇒ ϕ be an enumeration of the sequents of H which does not appear in H. Let Γ = Γ i . By applying internal weakenings on H , we obtain
Clearly, H Ω and Γ ⊆ T .
Proposition 42
Let Ω be an extended hypersequent, which is externally H-maximal with respect to a sequent s. If {s} Ω, then there exists a hypersequent H Ω such that
Proof Immediately follows from the definitions using internal and external weakenings.
A certain H-maximal extended hypersequent serves as the set of worlds in the refuting frame constructed in our completeness proof. Lemma 45 below ensures the existence of that extended hypersequent. In turn, for the proof of Lemma 45 we need the next two lemmas.
Lemma 43 Let H be a set of hypersequents closed under substitutions, and let H = Γ 1 ⇒ ∆ 1 | . . . | Γ n ⇒ ∆ n be a H-consistent finite extended hypersequent. Then there exists a Hconsistent finite extended hypersequent H of the form Γ 1 ⇒ ∆ 1 | . . . | Γ n ⇒ ∆ n , such that Γ i ⊆ Γ i and ∆ i ⊆ ∆ i for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and H admits the witness property.
Proof This extension is done in steps. In every step, we take some extended sequent Γ ⇒ ∆ ∈ H. If ∆ contains a formula of the form ∀x(ϕ{x/a}), we take a fresh free variable b (a free variable that does not occur in the current extended hypersequent), and add the formula ϕ{b/a} to ∆. Furthermore, if Γ contains a formula of the form ∃x(ϕ{x/a}), we again take a fresh free variable b, and add the formula ϕ{b/a} to Γ. We continue this procedure until the obtained extended hypersequent admits the witness property. Note that since the number of formulas in H is finite, and the complexity of the formulas which are added is decreasing, this procedure would terminate after a finite number of steps. H is the finite extended hypersequent obtained from H by this procedure. We show that every such extension keeps the extended hypersequent H-consistent (and thus H is H-consistent):
• Suppose that a H-consistent extended hypersequent H 1 contains a sequent Γ ⇒ ∆, where ∆ contains a formula of the form ∀x(ϕ{x/a}). G | Γ ⇒ ∀x(ϕ{b/a}{x/b}). Obviously, ∀x(ϕ{b/a}{x/b}) = ∀x(ϕ{x/a}), and so this contradicts the fact the H 1 is H-consistent.
• Suppose that a H-consistent extended hypersequent H 1 contains a sequent Γ ⇒ ∆, where Γ contains a formula of the form ∃x(ϕ{x/a}). Let H 2 be the extended hypersequent obtained from H 1 by adding ϕ{b/a} to Γ, where b is a free variable which does not occur in H 1 . Assume for contradiction that H 2 is not H-consistent. By Proposition 41, there exist a hypersequent G H 1 , and sequents
Obviously, ∃x(ϕ{b/a}{x/b}) = ∃x(ϕ{x/a}), and so this contradicts the fact the H 1 is H-consistent.
Lemma 44 Let H be a set of hypersequents closed under substitutions. and H = Γ 1 ⇒ ∆ 1 | . . . | Γ n ⇒ ∆ n be a H-consistent finite extended hypersequent. Let ϕ be an L-formula, and s be a sequent. Then there exists a H-consistent finite extended hypersequent H , such that:
• H is internally H-maximal with respect to ϕ.
• H is externally H-maximal with respect to s.
• H admits the witness property.
Proof Suppose s = Γ * ⇒ E. First, if H | s is H-consistent, let n = n + 1 and define Γ n+1 = Γ * and ∆ n+1 = E. Otherwise, let n = n. We recursively define a finite sequence of finite extended hypersequents,
We show how to construct 
Otherwise, if
Γ i 1 ⇒ U i 1 | . . . | Γ i i+1 ⇒ ∆ i i+1 , ϕ | . . . | Γ i n ⇒ ∆ i n is H-consistent, then Γ i+1 i+1 = Γ i i+1 , ∆ i+1 i+1 = ∆
It is easy to verify that H
n is a H-consistent finite extended hypersequent. By Lemma 43, there exists a H-consistent finite extended hypersequent, H of the form Γ 1 ⇒ ∆ 1 | . . . | Γ n ⇒ ∆ n , such that Γ n j ⊆ Γ j and ∆ n j ⊆ ∆ j for every 1 ≤ j ≤ n , and H admits the witness property. It is again easy to see that H has all the required properties. For example, we show that H is internally H-maximal with respect to ϕ. Let Γ ⇒ ∆ ∈ H . Suppose that Γ = Γ j and ∆ = ∆ j .
• Assume that ϕ ∈ Γ.
is not H-consistent.
It easily follows that H | Γ, ϕ ⇒ ∆ (which extends this finite extended hypersequent) is not H-consistent.
• Now, assume that ϕ ∈ ∆. If ϕ ∈ Γ, then since ϕ ⇒ ϕ is an axiom of HIF, H | Γ ⇒ ∆, ϕ is not H-consistent. Otherwise, ϕ ∈ Γ, and since Γ j j ⊆ Γ and ∆ j j ⊆ ∆, our construction ensures that Γ j−1 1
is not H-consistent. It easily follows that H | Γ ⇒ ∆, ϕ (which extends this finite extended hypersequent) is not H-consistent.
Lemma 45 Let H be a set of hypersequents closed under substitutions. Every H-consistent hypersequent H can be extended to a H-maximal extended hypersequent Ω.
Proof Suppose that H = Γ 1 ⇒ E 1 | . . . | Γ n ⇒ E n . Let ϕ 0 , ϕ 1 . . . be an enumeration of all L-formulas, in which every formula appears an infinite number of times. Let s 0 , s 1 . . . be an enumeration of all sequents of the form E 1 ⇒ E 2 .
We recursively define an infinite sequence of H-consistent finite extended hypersequents,
is defined. By Lemma 44, there exists a H-consistent hypersequent H such that:
• H is internally H-maximal with respect to ϕ i .
• H is externally H-maximal with respect to s i .
Let n i+1 = n , and
Note that after every step we have a H-consistent finite extended hypersequent, so Lemma 44 can be applied. Finally, let N be max{n 0 , n 1 , . . .} + 1, if such a maximum exists, and infinity otherwise.
Consistency Suppose by way of contradiction that
But, this contradicts the fact that H 0 is consistent, and that each application of Lemma 44 yields a H-consistent extended hypersequent.
Internal Maximality We show that Ω is internally H-maximal with respect to every L-formula. Let ϕ be an L-formula, and let T j ⇒ U j ∈ Ω. Since we included ϕ infinite number of times in the enumeration of the formulas, there exists some i ≥ n(j) such that ϕ i = ϕ. Our construction ensures that H i+1 is internally H-maximal with respect to ϕ, and so if
External Maximality
The Witness Property Let 1 ≤ j < N . We show that T j ⇒ U j admits the witness property. Assume ∀x(ϕ{x/a}) ∈ U j . Then ∀x(ϕ{x/a}) ∈ ∆ i j for some i ≥ n(j). We can assume that i > 0 (if it holds for i = 0 then it holds for i = 1 as well). Our construction ensures that H i admits the witness property, and so there exists a free variable b such that ϕ{b/a} ∈ ∆ i j . Since ∆ i j ⊆ U j . It follows that there exists a free variable b such that ϕ{b/a} ∈ U j . The case in which ∃x(ϕ{x/a}) ∈ T j is analogous.
Next we define the L-algebra used in the completeness proof. (t 1 , . . . , t n ) for every n-ary function symbol f and t 1 , . . . , t n ∈ D.
Note that the domain of the Herbrand L-algebra contains also non-closed terms. However, recall that we assume that the set of free variables and the set of bounded variables are disjoint, and so an L-term cannot contain a bounded variable. The following technical proposition is proved by a standard structural induction:
Proposition 47 Let M = D, I be the Herbrand L-algebra, and e be the identity L, M -evaluation (defined by e[a] = a for every free variable a). For every L-frame W = W, ≤, M, I , t 1 , . . . , t n ∈ D, distinct free variables a 1 , . . . , a n , and w ∈ W :
• For every L-term t: e [a 1 :=t 1 ,...,an:=tn] [t] = t{t 1 /a 1 , . . . , t n /a n }. In particular, e[t] = t.
• For every L-formula ϕ: W, w, e [a 1 :=t 1 ,...,an:=tn] ϕ iff W, w, e ϕ{t 1 /a 1 , . . . , t n /a n }.
• For every sequent s: W, w, e [a 1 :=t 1 ,...,an:=tn] s iff W, w, e s{t 1 /a 1 , . . . , t n /a n }.
We are now ready to establish the main completeness theorem.
Theorem 48 Let H 0 be a set of hypersequents closed under substitutions, and H 0 be a hypersequent. If
We construct an L-frame W which is a model of H 0 but not of H 0 . The availability of external and internal weakenings ensures that H 0 is H 0 -consistent. Thus by Lemma 45, there exists a H 0 -maximal extended hypersequent Ω such that H 0 Ω. Using Ω, W = W, ≤, M, I is defined as follows:
• W = Ω.
• For every
• M = D, I is the Herbrand L-algebra.
• I = {I w } w∈W where t 1 , . . . , t n ∈ I T⇒U [p] iff p(t 1 , . . . , t n ) ∈ T .
We first prove that W, ≤ is linearly ordered:
Partial Order Obviously ≤ is reflexive and transitive. To see that it is also anti-symmetric, let w 1 , w 2 be elements of W such that w 1 ≤ w 2 and w 2 ≤ w 1 . Assume that w 1 = T 1 ⇒ U 1 and w 2 = T 2 ⇒ U 2 . By definition, T 1 = T 2 in this case. Assume for contradiction that U 1 = U 2 , and let ϕ ∈ U 1 \ U 2 (w.l.o.g.).
Since Ω is internally H-maximal, by Proposition 41, H 0 frm[H 0 ] H | Γ ⇒ ϕ for some hypersequent H Ω and finite set Γ ⊆ T 2 . But, Γ ⇒ ϕ w 1 , and this contradicts Ω's H 0 -consistency. Hence U 1 = U 2 , and so w 1 = w 2 .
Linearity Let T 1 ⇒ U 1 , T 2 ⇒ U 2 ∈ W . Assume for contradiction that T 1 ⊆ T 2 and T 2 ⊆ T 1 .
Let ϕ 1 ∈ T 1 \ T 2 and ϕ 2 ∈ T 2 \ T 1 . Since Ω is internally H 0 -maximal, by Proposition 41, there exist hypersequents H 1 , H 2 Ω and sequents
But, note that Ω extends this hypersequent, and so this contradicts Ω's H 0 -consistency. Now, let e be the identity L, M -evaluation (defined by e[a] = a for every free variable a). Next we prove that the following hold for every w = T ⇒ U ∈ W :
(a) and (b) are proved together using a simultaneous induction on the complexity of ψ. Let w = T ⇒ U ∈ W .
• Suppose ψ is an atomic L-formula of the form p(t 1 , . . . , t n ). By definition, W, w, e ψ iff e[t 1 ], . . . , e[t n ] ∈ I w [p]. By Proposition 47, e[t i ] = t i for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Hence our construction ensures that W, w, e ψ iff ψ ∈ T . This proves (a). For (b), note that ϕ ⇒ ϕ is an axiom (for every L-formula ϕ), and since Ω is H 0 -consistent, ψ ∈ U implies ψ ∈ T . It follows that W, w, e ψ.
• Suppose ψ = ⊥. Then (b) is trivially true. On the other hand, (a) is vacuously true. To see this, assume that ⊥ ∈ T . Since ⊥ ⇒ is an axiom, H 0 frm[H 0 ] ⊥ ⇒. But, in this case {⊥ ⇒} Ω, and this contradicts Ω's H 0 -consistency.
• Suppose ψ = ϕ 1 ⊃ ϕ 2 .
1. Assume that ψ ∈ T . We show that for every element w ∈ W such that w ≤ w either W, w , e ϕ 1 or W, w , e ϕ 2 . Let w = T ⇒ U be an element of W , such that w ≤ w (and so, T ⊆ T ). By the induction hypothesis, it suffices to show that either ϕ 1 ∈ U or ϕ 2 ∈ T . Assume otherwise. By Proposition 41, there exist hypersequents H 1 , H 2 Ω, a finite set Γ 1 ⊆ T , and sequents
By n consecutive applications of (⊃⇒), 2. Assume that ψ ∈ U. By Ω's witness property, there exists a free variable b such that ϕ{b/a} ∈ U.
From the induction hypothesis it follows that W, w, e ϕ{b/a}. By Proposition 47, it follows that W, w, e [a:=b] ϕ, and so W, w, e ψ (since b ∈ D).
• Suppose ψ = ∃x(ϕ{x/a}).
1. Assume that ψ ∈ T . By Ω's witness property, there exists a free variable b such that ϕ{b/a} ∈ T . By the induction hypothesis, W, w, e ϕ{b/a}. By Proposition 47, it follows that W, w, e [a:=b] ϕ, and so W, w, e ψ (since b ∈ D).
2. Assume that W, w, e ψ. We show that ψ ∈ U. By definition, there exists some t ∈ D such that W, w, e [a:=t] ϕ. By Proposition 47, it follows that W, w, e ϕ{t/a}. By the induction hypothesis, ϕ{t/a} ∈ U. By Proposition 41, there exist hypersequent H Ω, and finite set Γ ⊆ T ,
It remains to show that W is a model of H 0 but not of H 0 . First, note that for every ϕ ∈ frm[H 0 ] and T ⇒ U ∈ Ω, either ϕ ∈ T or ϕ ∈ U. Otherwise, by Proposition 41, there exist hypersequents
Second, we prove that for every hypersequent
, there exists some s ∈ H such that W, w, e s for every w ∈ W . Indeed, if H Ω, then there exists a sequent s = Γ ⇒ E, such that s ∈ H and s w for every w ∈ W . Let w ∈ W . Assume that w = T ⇒ U. Since s w, there either exists ϕ ∈ Γ such that ϕ ∈ T , or ϕ ∈ E such that ϕ ∈ U. By the previous claim (since frm[H] ⊆ frm[H 0 ]), this implies that there either exists ϕ ∈ Γ such that ϕ ∈ U, or ϕ ∈ E such that ϕ ∈ T . By (a) and (b), either there exists ϕ ∈ Γ such that W, w, e ϕ, or there exists ϕ ∈ E such that W, w, e ϕ. Therefore, W, w, e s. Now let H ∈ H 0 , and let e * be an arbitrary L, M -evaluation. We show that there exists some s ∈ H such that W, w, e * s for every w ∈ W . Let a 1 , . . . , a k be the free variables appearing in H, and let H = H{e 
Density Rule
In [24] the following density rule was introduced and used to axiomatize standard first-order Gödel logic:
where p (a metavariable for a nullary predicate symbol) does not occur in the conclusion. In [22] this rule was proved to be admissible (using a semantic proof). The (single-conclusion) hypersequent version of this rule has the form (see [7] ):
where, again, p does not occur in the conclusion. Note that if we allow also derivations from a non-empty set of assumptions, then this rule is not valid (for example, ⇒ p ⇒ using external weakening and this rule).
To solve this, we should require that p does not occur in the set of assumptions as well. We next prove the strong soundness of (density) under this condition. 
If W is a model of H then we are done. Otherwise, W is a model of Γ 1 ⇒ p | Γ 2 , p ⇒ E. We prove that W is a model of Γ 1 , Γ 2 ⇒ E. Assume otherwise. Thus there exists an L, M -evaluation e 0 and w 0 ∈ W , such that W, w 0 , e 0 Γ 1 , Γ 2 ⇒ E. Let W = W , ≤ , M, {I w } w∈W , where:
• W = W ∪ {w 0 } where w 0 is a new world.
• ≤ =≤ ∪{ w, w 0 | w < w 0 } ∪ { w 0 , w | w 0 ≤ w} ∪ { w 0 , w 0 } • For every w ∈ W , I w = I w , except (possibly) for I w [p] which is ∅ for w < w 0 , and { } for w ≥ w 0 .
In addition, I w 0 = I w 0 , except (possibly) for I w 0 [p] which is ∅.
It is easy to see that for every sequent s in which p does not occur, w ∈ W , and L, M -evaluation e, W, w, e s iff W , w, e s, and W, w 0 , e s iff W , w 0 , e s. Hence, W , w 0 , e 0 Γ 1 , Γ 2 ⇒ E, and W , w 0 , e 0 Γ 1 , Γ 2 ⇒ E. Now, note that W , w 0 , e 0 p ⇒ and W , w 0 , e 0 ⇒ p. Finally, note that by Corollary 49, it follows that (density) is admissible in HIF (also with non-empty set of assumptions).
Multiple-Conclusion Version
In this section we present the multiple-conclusion version from [6] of the system HIF, and prove its strong soundness and completeness, as well as strong cut-admissibility. The proposed system, which we call MCG, can be seen as a combination of HIF and the well-known multiple-conclusion sequent system for intuitionistic logic (called LJ in [23] ).
Proof We prove the claim by induction on |∆ 1 |+|∆ 2 |. First, if ∆ 1 or ∆ 2 is empty, then the claim follows by applying external weakening. Assume that |∆ 1 |, |∆ 2 | > 0, |∆ 1 | + |∆ 2 | = l and that the claim holds for every ∆ 1 , ∆ 2 such that |∆ 1 | + |∆ 2 | < l. Let ϕ 1 ∈ ∆ 1 and ϕ 2 ∈ ∆ 2 , and let ∆ 1 = ∆ 1 \ {ϕ 1 } and ∆ 2 = ∆ 2 \ {ϕ 2 }. Using (com) on the identity axioms ϕ 1 ⇒ ϕ 1 and ϕ 2 ⇒ ϕ 2 , we derive ϕ 1 ⇒ ϕ 2 | ϕ 2 ⇒ ϕ 1 . By a cut on ϕ 1 of this hypersequent and the assumption H | Γ ⇒ ∆ 1 , ∆ 2 , we obtain H | Γ ⇒ ∆ 1 , ∆ 2 | ϕ 2 ⇒ ϕ 1 . Another cut on ϕ 2 of this hypersequent and the same assumption now yields H | Γ ⇒ ∆ 1 , ∆ 2 | Γ ⇒ ∆ 1 , ∆ 2 . By applying (twice) the induction hypothesis, we obtain a derivation of H | Γ ⇒ ∆ 1 | Γ ⇒ ∆ 2 | Γ ⇒ ∆ 1 | Γ ⇒ ∆ 2 in which cuts are only made on formulas from ∆ 1 ∪ ∆ 2 . The claim follows by applying internal weakenings.
Next, we study the relation between MCG and HIF.
Definition 62 Given a multiple-conclusion sequent s = (Γ ⇒ ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n ), s ≤1 is the (single-conclusion) hypersequent Γ ⇒ ϕ 1 | . . . | Γ ⇒ ϕ n | Γ ⇒ . Given a multiple-conclusion hypersequent H, H ≤1 is the (single-conclusion) hypersequent s∈H s ≤1 . For a set of multiple-conclusion hypersequents H, we denote the set {H ≤1 | H ∈ H} by H ≤1 .
For example, ( ⇒ p 1 (a 1 ) | p 2 (a 1 ) ⇒ p 3 (a 1 ), p 4 (a 1 ))
Further Research
Many other (multiple or single-conclusion) hypersequent systems for various propositional and first-order fuzzy logics and intermediate logics have only syntactic proofs of (usual) cut-elimination theorem (see e.g. [20] ). It should be interesting to find for them too simpler semantic proofs and derive corresponding strong cut-admissibility theorems. However, for other fuzzy logics, simple Kripke-style semantics do not exist (to the best of our knowledge), and new methods should be developed.
